Operation SHOWDOWN
As the indications that the Communists were seizing the initiative on the ground became more apparent in late September and early October, General Van Fleet grew concerned. In his letter of 5 October to Clark urging the approval of a limited objective attack on the U.S. IX Corps front, he commented: "It is extremely desirable that we take the initiative by small offensive actions, which will put the enemy on the defensive in order to reverse the present situation. Our present course of defensive action in the face of the enemy initiative is resulting in the highest casualties since the heavy fighting of October and November 1951."
To offset this trend, Van Fleet recommended the adoption of the IX Corps plan, called SHOWDOWN, that was designed to improve the corps defense lines north of Kumhwa. Less than three miles north of this city, Van Fleet pointed out, IX Corps and enemy troops manned positions that were but 200 yards apart. On Hill 598 and Sniper Ridge, which ran northwest to southeast a little over a mile northeast of Hill 598, the opposing forces looked down each other's throats and casualties were correspondingly high. If the enemy could be pushed off these hills, Van Fleet went on, he would have to fall back 1,250 yards to the next defensive position. Counting on maximum firepower, consistent with ammunition allowances, and maximum close air support, the Eighth Army commander was optimistic about the possibilities of SHOWDOWN.
Although Clark had voiced his opposition to hilltaking expeditions in the past, he evidently decided that SHOWDOWN offered a better than average chance for winning its objectives without excessive casualties. If all went according to plan, two battalions, one from the U.S. 7th Division and the other from the ROK 2d Division, would be sufficient to accomplish the mission. The field commanders estimated that the operation would take five days and incur about 200 casualties. With sixteen battalions of artillery mounting some 280 guns, and over 200 fighter-bomber sorties in support, the infantry was not expected to encounter serious obstacles. At any rate, Clark approved SHOWDOWN on 8 October, but cautioned Van Fleet to give the operation only routine press coverage and to stress the tactical considerations arguing for the seizure of the hills.
